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“Whether small states can get away with annoying big states seems to 
be a question with a lot of potential for getting at some central issues in 
the field of International Relations.” Jason Sharman (2006) 
“The global financial crisis arose amidst the failure of the international 
community to give the globalized economy credible global rules, 
especially with regard to international financial relations and 
macroeconomic policies...Nothing short of closing down the big casino 
will provide a lasting solution.” UNCTAD (2009) 
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Introduction:  
The ongoing global financial turmoil (GFT) has brought to the fore yet 
again the question of forces driving the globalised economy and ways to 
tame them. There is a burgeoning literature and on-going debate 
amongst economists and political scientists on the causes and 
consequences of an increasingly globalised world economy. Part of this 
discussion, driven by scholars and policy makers alike, is the question to 
what extent this process has contributed to the marginalisation and/or 
exclusion of, and some would say was achieved at the expense of, large 
chunks of the population and certain countries or group of countries
1
.  
Underpinning this debate is a discussion regarding the respective roles 
of free market forces and government regulation.  At the same time, 
globalisation is accompanied by (or indeed lead to) a relatively new 
phenomenon, namely the increasing tendency of otherwise sovereign 
states to surrender part of their sovereignty to supranational 
institutions. Part of this process is the greater degree of regional trade, 
economic and monetary integration between groups of countries, 
sometimes accompanied by various levels and degrees of political 
integration. This is particularly the case when one is looking at the 
evolution of European Integration and the creation of the European 
Union (EU). These debates have many analytical facets and theoretical 
underpinnings, as well as empirical implications, which are well beyond 
the remit of this lecture
2
. Rather, I propose to look at some of these 
issues from the perspective of a subset of countries which are often 
neglected from this debate, namely small states
3
.  
                                                            
1
 Collier (2007) argues that this group is fairly large, and includes some fifty-eight states, and about 
one billion people who are currently “missing the boat” (see Chapter 6).     
2
 Some of these issues, the causes, consequences and sequencing of economic integration 
agreements are discussed in Estevadeordal and Suominen (2007, 2008),  Bergstrand, Estevadeordal 
and  Evenett (2008), Baier, Bergstrand, Egger and McLaughlin (2008), and in the case of the EU, 
Eichengreen (2004), Alesina and Perotti (2004), and more recently, Eichengreen and Boltho (2007), 
Bergstrand (2008). 
3
Collier (2007) speaks of “Small countries” that are badly governed. However, the author doesn’t 
provide a formal definition of what are small countries, other than that “combined, they have fewer 
people than either India or China. And since their per capita income is also very low, the income of 
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More specifically, in the next section I propose to explore what is so 
special about small states in general, and why they are sometimes (or 
ought to be ) seen as a sui generis group of countries, while in the 
following section I focus on the lessons learned so far form the global 
financial crisis. In the penultimate section I focus on the implications on 
the implications of this crisis for small states, before drawing some 
general conclusions.   
What is the Problem with Small States?   
There are two important reasons why one would want to focus on small 
states in the context of a lecture on international political economy and 
the global financial turmoil. First, as suggested in Sharman’s quote at the 
begging of this presentation, because of their size, small states often lack 
some of the key features of “normal-sized” countries, such as armies, 
full-fledged diplomatic missions
4
 and tax collection services. Therefore, 
they often offer interesting case studies to explore relations between 
them and larger, richer or more powerful neighbours or partners
5
.  
Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing 
disintegration of many of its constituent parts and satellites (with the 
more recent example the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 
Georgia) there is a proliferation of new, often small, states which is 
changing the landscape of international relations.  Following the 
(relatively) short periods of euphoria, many of these states started 
forging more or less strong bilateral and multilateral links with former 
                                                                                                                                                                               
the typical country in also negligible [sic], less than that of most rich-word cities” (p.7). Curiously, in 
his discussion on the subject (of failing) small countries, he mentions Nigeria, Bangladesh, Chad, 
Angola, Central African Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Solomon Islands, Zimbabwe and 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, not exactly the smallest of states by any standard.   
4
 Thus many small states, most of which are members of the Commonwealth, can’t even afford to 
have permanent missions and representations at the UN (whether in New York or in Geneva) or at the 
WTO, and are thus serviced by a common office, run by the Commonwealth Secretariat funded by 
Commonwealth development partners.   
5
 For a recent excellent analysis from a constructivist perspective of the struggle for global tax 
regulation between small states and the economically powerful members of the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) see Sharman (2006).  
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regional foes and friends, with a view to (re)building closer political, 
military and economic relations. In the economic and trade spheres, this 
process provided added impetus to the on-going upsurge of 
international cooperation agreements, resulting in a very dense network 
of bilateral and regional economic integration agreements, often 
described as a “spaghetti bowl”.   In fact, many analysts argue that for 
small states, “global connectedness” is the only way to prosperity in an 
increasingly integrated, and technologically sophisticated, global 
economy. However, deepening relations with other countries often 
requires considerable resources, both in the public and private sectors. 
But, as we pointed out above, this is something they dearly miss, and 
this is why small states, with their limited capacity, need to be strategic 
in their international outreach efforts
6
. 
So, what do we mean by small states? Notwithstanding some dissenting 
voices, it is generally recognised that small states are sovereign, 
internationally recognised, countries with populations of up to 2 million 
inhabitants
7
.  Although to a large extent arbitrary, this cut-off point has, 
nevertheless, the basic attribute of (what Schelling calls) a “focal point”
8
, 
namely that it provides a (rational) point of convergence among 
researchers, in the sense that it focuses their attention on the issue.  
Based on this definition there are, currently, 49 small states. Most of 
them are located in three regions, namely, Africa, East Asia-Pacific and 
Latin America and the Caribbean, of which thirty-one are islands
9
. Only 
                                                            
6
 Rose and Stevens (2004), based on the recent theories of economic growth and with reference to 
New Zealand, develop a set of “criteria for selecting countries as partners for deeper bilateral 
economic linkages across six global connectedness dimensions: FDI, R&D links, trade in goods, 
inbound tourism, education export, and people linkages”. (p.i)  
7
 Kuznetz (1960), in his path-breaking essay on this issue, used population as the relevant size 
concept, but set the 10 million mark as his upper limit. On the other hand, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat in its work on small states uses the 1.5 million inhabitants cut-off, although it includes in 
this group larger member countries such as Jamaica, Namibia, Lesotho and Papua New Guinea.   
8
 Also known as the “Schelling point”, after the name of the US economist and game theorist who first 
coined and developed the concept, Thomas Schelling (1960).   
9
 Note that given that the main reliable source of data on most of these countries is the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI), this number does not include non World Bank members such 
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eight of them are in Europe, while five are EU member states (see Table 
1).  
This list calls for several remarks. First, most of these countries, gained 
their independence after 1960, while four, namely Timor-Lest, 
Montenegro, Estonia, and Slovenia became independent states only 
recently.  This relatively recent phenomenon of the proliferation of small 
states, appears to have been the main driving force for the continued 
interest on the issue. Second, population size is highly correlated with 
two other features, namely insularity and isolation
10
.   
Scholars and policy-makers have debated the question as to why small 
states should be classified under a separate category, along with the 
other groupings of countries with such epithets as: “Less Developed”, 
“Developing”, “Emerging”, “Transition”, etc.  The general consensus is 
that because of their size, small states share a number of characteristics 
which warrants their inclusion in a separate grouping in the global nexus 
of relations between nations.  It should be notice here that despite the 
fact “that small states as a group do not have low incomes, nor are their 
growth rates lower, on average, than those of other countries” (Favaro 
and Peretz (2008)), nevertheless these characteristics do inhibit their 
economic development. Furthermore, although small states receive 
considerable volumes of Official Development Assistance (ODA), relative 
to the size of their populations and economies, they nevertheless face 
additional costs in managing this ODA
11
 . 
While different authors, country officials and international 
organisations, emphasise different aspects that, in their view, are 
                                                                                                                                                                               
as Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue and Tuvalu. Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper, we have also 
included Slovenia in this group, which, according to the latest Eurostat data, has a population of 
2030000 inhabitants.   
10
 For a discussion and some evidence of this, see Winters and Martins (2004). 
11
 See World Bank, IEG (2006). 
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relevant and common to small states, the most often mentioned 
“enduring” characteristics are
12
: 
• Remoteness and insularity
13
; 
• Susceptibility to natural disasters such as hurricanes, tsunamis, 
cyclones, earthquakes, tropical storms which typically affect the 
entire population and economy; 
• Highly volatile growth rates; 
• Limited institutional capacity, due to the high per capita cost of 
public services; 
• Limited economic diversification, due to the narrow resource basis 
and small domestic markets; 
• Openness and heavy reliance to world trade and market access to 
export their commodities; 
• Limited access to external private capital; 
• Poverty due to the limited employment opportunities.  
In addition, more recent challenges are now gradually emerging, albeit 
at different degrees, such as: 
• The faster than anticipated erosion of the preferential access to 
markets for traditional exports; 
• Increased environmental susceptibility due to global warming; 
• Rising concerns with respect to growing youth unemployment in 
some of these economies, the costs of the post-9/11 security 
concerns, and drug-related crime; and 
• The costs and devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
                                                            
12
 See Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank (2000), accessible at www.worldbank.orf/smallstates; 
and the follow-up study, by Briguglio et al. (2006).   
13
 One could have added “landlockness” as a distinct characteristic. Indeed, Collier (2007) argues that 
these countries are indeed in a trap which, coupled with “bad neighbours” could have devastating 
effects on development of the countries concerned.  
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Looking at this list, it is clear that most of these phenomena represent 
real challenges to the economic development and growth potential of 
most, if not all, small states. At the same time, if one is interested in 
developing and implementing policies to address these challenges, then 
one needs to analyse more carefully the nature of these challenges, as 
well as their developmental implications.     
An increasing number of economists are now asking these questions, 
and are coming up with some interesting answers. Looking at the nature 
of these challenges from the policy perspective, it is important to note, 
at the outset, that not all these challenges are equally susceptible to 
policy interventions. Indeed, insularity, isolation and susceptibility to 
natural disasters are largely unalterable “handicaps”, and could certainly 
not be subjected to policy intervention
14
.  Furthermore, some 
economists are asking a more fundamental question, namely is 
(population) size exogenous, as most studies seem to assume, or is the 
size of a country endogenous and thus determined by (external) causes? 
This is a question familiar to many philosophers, since Plato and 
Aristotle, and to political scientists and historians, since Montesquieu, 
but rather new for us economists. Recently, some economists have 
argued, and provided evidence to that effect, that while it is true that 
size influences economic performance, the converse is also true. In 
particular, a key factor determining the boundaries of a country, and 
therefore its size, is its degree of openness to trade
15
. The basic 
argument is fairly simple and posits that, as far as economic 
performance is concerned, trade could be a substitute to country size 
and a small domestic market.  
                                                            
14
 Hughes and Brewster (2002), coined the expression “endowed handicaps” to describe these 
challenges.   
15
 Other factors include the economies of scale associated with the provision of public goods and the 
degree of “heterogeneity” within the country. See in particular, among others, Alesina, Spolare and 
Wacziarg (2000) and (2004). 
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Furthermore, because these challenges are often interrelated, i.e. 
statistically highly correlated, it is difficult to untangle the specific effects 
of each one of them on economic performance.   
For example, remoteness (i.e. geographical location) and insularity are 
highly correlated with each other and population size. Thus, two regions, 
the Pacific and the Caribbean, which are almost entirely comprised of 
small island states, together represent almost half the list of small states. 
Another example is the high degree of correlation between the 
susceptibility to natural disasters, the resulting increased environmental 
susceptibility to global warming, and the highly volatile growth rates of 
small states. In addition, the heavy reliance of small states on word 
trade, coupled with the limited diversification of their export base, 
means that the faster than anticipated erosion of trade preferences will 
have an even greater effect on their performance than for countries 
with either a more diversified economy and/or less reliant on export 
markets. In the same vein, as correctly pointed out by Hughes and 
Brewster (2002), most of the foreign investment flows in these 
economies where the direct result of the preferential access to key 
developed markets. Thus, the erosion of trade preferences has also had 
a negative effect on FDI flows.   
Even so, Winters and Martins (2003) have attempted to unravel and 
quantify the effects of some of these characteristics on the 
(microeconomic) performance of small states. Their conclusions are very 
revealing:  “We conclude that there are significant size effects on the 
costs analysed (transportation costs, labour costs, etc)… Overall, the 
results are striking, pointing out to strong potential economic 
disadvantage of small size” (p.3).  Further down, they write “at very low 
size, the cost disadvantages [in key export sectors such as electronic 
assembly, clothing and tourism], are crushing, but that they dissipate 
fairly quickly as size increase…[and] that economic smallness presents 
significant policy challenges.” (p. 5)
16
.  
                                                            
16
 Of course one could argue (and some did) that some of these challenges are not caused by 
smallness as such but, rather, by bad economic policies and poor governance. Hughes and Brewster 
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The EU has long recognised that geographical or regional disparities 
inhibit economic growth and development. This is even more so 
following the recent addition of twelve new member countries, ten of 
which have levels of economic development well below the EU-15, pre-
enlargement average.  Hence, the necessity for a greater focus on EU 
cohesion and the need for better funded regional policy instruments.    
Looking at the enlarged EU, in 2007, the five large Member States (i.e. 
those with more than 5 per cent of EU27 GDP) represented more than 
72 per cent of the GDP of the EU27. At the other end, the ten smaller 
members (i.e. with less than 1 per cent of EU27 GDP) represented less 
than four 4 per cent of EU27 GDP. In fact, the combined GDP of the ten 
Medium-sizes Member States (i.e. those with 1-5 per cent of EU27 GDP) 
was barely larger than that of the largest economy, Germany (23.7 per 
cent compared to 19.7 per cent)
17
. 
As a result of the latest EU enlargement the number of small states (as 
per our definition) within the EU has increased by four, namely: Cyprus, 
Estonia, Malta and Slovenia, hereafter referred to as EU4
18
.  
Like their counter-parts in the rest of the world, these states had, in 
2007, relatively robust GDP growth rates (4.4 per cent, 7.1 per cent, 3.9 
per cent and 6.1 per cent respectively), well over the EU27 average (2.9 
per cent)
19
. At the same time, they also share most of the challenges 
identified
20
. Indeed, all four are on the fringes of the EU and, relatively 
                                                                                                                                                                               
(2002) as well as Winters and Martins (2003) have looked at this claim and rejected it, opting instead 
for a distinct and separate size effect. That said, in some cases, small states are indeed badly 
governed which of creates an added handicap often difficult to overcome (see Collier (2007), Chapter 
5)  
17
 See Eurostat (2008a), Table 2.2.1, p.29. 
18
 Latvia, with little over 2.2 million inhabitants, and Lithuania, with over 3.3 million inhabitants could, 
conceivably, also have been included, but were not for the sake of consistency. 
19
 See Eurostat (2008a), Figure 2.2.9, p.38. 
20
 A recent World Bank study by Thomas and Pang (2007) on this subject uses instead a very curious 
and arbitrary selection of countries, which includes: Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Slovenia. Interestingly and amazingly, it seems completely oblivious of the existence of Malta and, 
quite surprisingly, drops early-on in the discussion Cyprus, the second best performer in the EU zone 
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remote from the main core of the EU, have limited institutional capacity 
to implement the EU acquis, are relatively open to trade and have 
limited access to foreign capital. 
Furthermore, the EU4 can be regrouped into two smaller subgroups: the 
two smaller Mediterranean islands (Cyprus and Malta) members of the 
Euro area since January 2008 with a common colonial heritage and, 
Estonia and Slovenia which are following a parallel transition to market 
economies. Countries in each subgroup face additional challenges. For 
the former, there is increased environmental susceptibility to climate 
change, such as repeated periods of prolonged drought, and an 
enhanced vulnerability to illegal immigration and people trafficking 
because of their location. For the latter, both countries gained 
independence after the break-up of larger centrally planned economies, 
with the resulting loss of preferential access to traditional markets and 
sources of inputs, the need to privatise their economies, and to radically 
readjust their growth and development strategies
21
.      
In order to address these issues the EU is pursuing an active regional 
policy to reduce economic and social disparities, to show solidarity and 
remain competitive and to meet the challenges of the 21
st
 century.  
To that effect, it has developed a number of financial instruments aimed 
at three specific objectives, namely:  
                                                                                                                                                                               
in terms of GDP growth, see Eurostat (2008b) Table 3.1.1., on the grounds that it “has shown relative 
decline to mediocre economic performance (sic)” (p.8);  at the same time, it includes in the group, 
Ireland (with a population of over 4 million) for no other reason than “because its recent growth 
experience”,  and Iceland (a non-EU member country), while completely ignoring Lithuania, without 
any explanation provided. In another glaring omission of the paper, in the discussion of Luxemburg 
there is no mention of the beneficial role of Benelux, one of the most successful and lasting examples 
of monetary and economic integration which preceded the EU. Finally, in reviewing Estonia’s 
economic strategy (p.15), it refers to “two elements” [of successful policy response to smallness, 
namely]: “(a) Streamlining the state...”, “(b)Emphasis on technology...”, and “(c)Reorientation of trade 
patters...” (sic).  
21
 See the discussion in Thomas and Pang (2007). 
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(1) achieving Convergence between countries, i.e. “to promote 
growth-enhancing conditions and factors leading to real 
convergence for the least-developed Member States and regions”; 
(2) strengthening Regional Competitiveness and Employment, for 
outside the Convergence regions; and,  
(3) European Territorial Cooperation to “strengthen cross-border co-
operation through joint local and regional initiatives, trans-
national co-operation aiming at integrated territorial 
development, and interregional co-operation and exchange of 
experience”
22
.  
These instruments include, among others,  
(1) the European Regional and Development Fund (ERDF), aimed at 
strengthening social cohesion in the EU “by correcting imbalances 
between its regions”; 
(2)  the European Social Fund (ESF), seeking to “improve the 
employment and job opportunities within the EU”; 
(3)  and the Cohesion Fund (CF), “aimed at Member States whose 
Gross National Income (GNI) per inhabitant is less than 90% of the 
Community average”.  
All EU4 states are (still) eligible to receive funding from the CF, and 
partly from ERDF
23
, see Table 2. In fact, referring to Table 3, while the 
average EU27 citizen will receive, during the 2007-13 period, on average 
euro 698,000 of regional cohesion support, Cypriots will receive more 
                                                            
22
For more details, follow the following link: www.ec.europa.eu/regional_policy.  
23
 An instrument may have more than one objective. Thus, ERDF funds can be used for all three 
objectives, ESF for the first two, while CF can only be used for Convergence.  Also note that for the 
purposes of the regional policy, Estonia and Slovenia are considered “regions” at the level 2 of the 
EU’s nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) and are therefore eligible to access ERDF 
and ESF.   
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than euro 800,000 and the citizens of the remaining three more than 
euro 2,000,000 each
24
.  
However it is worth pointing out that the objectives of this policy, and 
instruments used, were not specifically designed and aimed at 
addressing the challenges specific to small states. In that sense, they are 
not addressing the needs of these states. Furthermore, looking at the 
FDI outflows from the EU15 to the twelve new member states
25
, it is 
clear that the EU4 are not the main recipients of FDI from fellow 
member states.  
In particular, in 2004 they received only EUR 2.6 bn, which represents a 
mere 1.6 per cent of the total extra-EU15 FDI and 13.6 per cent of the 
total outflows to new member states. The respective figures for 2005 
and 2006 are: EUR 7.8 bn (i.e. 2.7 & 20 per cent respectively) and EUR 
5.7 bn (i.e. 2 &15 per cent respectively)
26
.   In fact, at the end 2006,  the 
lion’s share of FDI stocks held by EU-15 in the new member countries, 
i.e. 77 per cent of the total, were in four countries, namely: Poland (EUR 
68.4 bn), Hungary (EUR 64.6 bn), Czech Republic (EUR 52.4 bn) and 
Romania (EUR 24.4 bn).    
The Key Lessons from the Global Financial Turmoil 
Looking at the GFT from the vantage point of a national regulator, it is 
revealing to note the five lessons that SARB Governor Tito Mboweny has 
drawn from the current GFT
27
. This confession is instructive because it 
reveals that policy-makers, who should have known better, either chose 
to disregard or perhaps didn’t even attend their Economics 101 lectures!  
                                                            
24
 These figures were derived by dividing the indicative financial allocation for each country (in current 
prices) for the period 2007-2013, by the population on August 1 2008. 
25
 See Eurostat (2008c). 
26
 Note that the 2006 figure for Malta, and therefore EU4, doesn’t include the EUR 8.9 bn one-off 
investment from the German chemical and financial sector linked to activities of Special Purpose 
Entities, which are mainly holding companies.   
27
 See the speech by Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni, entitled “Central 
Banks and Financial Stability-some lessons for the future”, http://www.bis.org/review/r090319b.pdf . 
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In particular,  
Lesson 1: “The sum of perfectly rational individual decisions doesn’t 
equal a perfectly rational market”.  
This is what every first year economics student knows as the “fallacy of 
composition”. It summarises what any financial regulator should have 
known, namely, that at a systemic level the integrated global financial 
system is finite and that although risk can be passed around, this does 
not mean it has disappeared! 
Lesson 2: “If something seems too good to last, it probably is.”  
Again this lesson is known to every economics freshman as Milton 
Friedman’s famous aphorism “there is no such a thing as a free lunch”! 
So that when asset prices, the balance sheets of financial institutions 
and profit targets out-grow consistently and significantly the growth 
rates of the real underlying economy, then something is wrong and will 
have to yield! 
Lesson 3: “The seeds of the next crisis are sown in the solutions for the 
current one.” 
Looking at the types of action taken by central banks and ministries of 
finance to deal with the GFT it is difficult to think what else they could 
do to restore confidence in the banking system. These include significant 
injection of liquidity, the lowering of collateral requirements, asset 
swaps, longer-maturity refinancing operations, intervention in foreign 
exchange markets, co-operation among central banks in their open 
market operations, monetary accommodation, quantitative or credit 
easing, capital injections into banks and other financial institutions, 
substantial fiscal stimulus packages and, in some cases, nationalisation 
of banks. Again, students of macroeconomics should know that the 
problem with these policy initiatives is to avoid three unintended, but 
common, consequences of such active policy interventions, namely 
crowding-out of the private sector, inflationary pressures and moral 
hazard.  
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Lesson 4: “Every good party needs a strong bouncer.” 
Clearly in the context of financial markets, the bouncers are the 
supervisors who, need it be said, must have the necessary muscle to 
weed-out potential trouble-makers. Pushing Tito Mboweny’s analogy a 
step further, clearly bouncers seem to know their trade better because, 
more often than not, they act proactively, through “face control”. 
Unfortunately, regulators haven’t quite mastered the tricks of the trade 
yet. Indeed, although the warning signs were there, namely excessive 
leverage, unreliable credit-ratings, under-pricing and under-estimation 
of risks, herding behaviour through the excessive reliance on similar 
mathematical models, skewed executive incentives etc, the “bouncers” 
were caught napping and/or chose to ignore them!  
Lesson 5: “Common sense should prevail” (or, as Voltaire actually wrote, 
“common sense is quite rare”). 
Here, the Governor warns of the growing divide between 
mathematically unsophisticated Boards of Directors, who of course have 
the necessary business acumen, and the people they are suppose to 
oversee, namely the engineers/mathematicians who develop 
increasingly complex risk management models, but lack basic business 
skills.  Again very few economics student (that I know!) will disagree with 
the governor’s statement that “perhaps one good thing about the 
current crisis is that engineering students will in future actually do what 
they have been trained for: to be engineers. In the past decade or so, 
the financial world has been taken over by mathematicians, statisticians, 
engineers and scientists.” 
Although candid, for many observers this mea culpa doesn’t go far 
enough. Many analysts now believe that the problems run deeper 
require more radical remedies.  According to the UNCTAD’s 2009 report 
quoted at the beginning, “The crisis dynamics reflect failures in national 
and international financial deregulation, persistent global imbalances, 
absence of an international monetary system and deep inconsistencies 
among global trading, financial and monetary policies.” As a result of this 
diagnosis, UNCTAD’s report is an indictment against laissez faire.  It 
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advocates instead a “comprehensive reform and re-regulation with a 
vigorous role by Governments working in unison” and proposes a 
number of national and multilateral remedies that place government 
debt inflation, the (global) re-regulation of financial markets and (global) 
exchange rate arrangements at center stage. The key objective of this 
exercise should be “the systematic weeding out of financial 
sophistication with no social return.” At the same time, and not 
surprisingly, UNCTAD calls for a revival and broadening of 
multilateralism and cooperation in global economic decision-making, 
which will be driven by the UN (i.e. the G192!).  
 
In the same spirit, another UN Committee of Experts, known as the 
“Stiglitz Commission”
28
, asserts: 
The current crisis reflects problems that go beyond the conduct of 
monetary policy and regulation of the financial sector. It also involves 
deeper inadequacies in areas such as corporate governance and 
competition policies. Many of these failings, in turn, have been supported 
by a flawed understanding of the functioning of markets, which also 
contributed to the recent drive towards financial deregulation. These 
views have been the basis for the design of policies advocated by some of 
the international economic institutions, and for much of the architecture 
of globalization. More generally, the current crisis has exposed 
deficiencies in the policies of some  national authorities and international 
institutions based on previously fashionable economic doctrines, which 
held that unfettered markets are, on their own, quickly self-correcting 
and efficient. Globalization too was constructed on these flawed 
hypotheses; and while it has brought benefits to many, it has also 
enabled defects in one economic system to spread quickly around the 
world, bringing recessions and impoverization even to developing 
countries that have developed good regulatory frameworks, created 
effective monetary institutions, and succeeded in implementing sound 
fiscal policies. 
 
 
                                                            
28
 See UN (2009)  
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So, other than the fact that, as we pointed out above, there are really no 
new lessons coming out of the current crisis. What is remarkable is that 
many of the things that are now being advocated to get us out of the 
GFT, are in fact long-standing demands by Small States in their quest for 
a fairer and more equitable international division of labour and a fairer 
globalised economy. 
Some Implications for Small States  
Under these circumstances, what are the implications for Small States? 
Clearly, all these lessons are relevant to Small States and need to be 
acted upon by national and global policy-makers. However, given the 
enhanced vulnerability to external shocks identified earlier, one expects 
that Small States, more than any other country grouping, will be 
adversely affected by the current turmoil. Looking at the array of Small 
States identified earlier, it is clear that each region has its own specific 
circumstances which can not easily be generalised. It is nevertheless 
possible, and therefore useful, to identify recurring common specific 
areas of concerns cutting across regions.  
More specifically, we can observe a: 
• Drop in remittances from the Diaspora, especially in the Caribbean 
and Pacific, where they are often the largest or second largest 
source of foreign exchange; 
• Drop in export commodity prices, as a result of the dramatic 
reduction in global demand, especially in Africa;  
• Protectionist tendencies in European and North American markets 
affecting all exports, across the board; 
• Drop in tourism revenues, across the board;  
• Drop in construction activity, especially linked to the tourist 
industry and residences bought by expatriates and foreigners, 
across the board; 
• Drop in (the already very low) FDI, especially those linked to 
tourism, construction, and commodity exports, across the board;  
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• Drop in capital flows due to enhanced political risk, the “flight to 
quality”, and the focus on short term end of yield curve, across 
the board; 
• Drop in (already low) SME lending, due to the sharp contraction in 
liquidity and increased risk aversion, even from indigenous banks 
who take a very short term view, across the board; 
• Increase in youth unemployment and crime and illegal 
immigration, with a growing number of Caribbean, Pacific and 
Mediterranean countries becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
these threats to human security; 
• Increase in the levels of public debt, in countries such as Iceland 
and the Baltic states; 
• Renewed and concerted assault by G8 and G22 on so-called “Tax 
Havens”, in a drive by OECD countries to enhance their fiscal 
revenues, which affects countries which rely on their International 
Financial Services Sectors;  
• Regulation “externalities” as a result of calls for enhanced, costly, 
national and international regulation and supervision thus putting 
additional pressures on already severely capacity-constrained 
administrations, across the board; 
• Continued marginalisation in world affairs, lack of voice in the 
reform of IFIs and global governance, across the board;  
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Conclusions 
 
There is increasing recognition that globalisation represents challenges 
and opportunities for small and large states alike. There is also 
recognition that small states face special challenges as a direct result of 
their size. Most of these states are concentrated in three regions, the 
Caribbean, the Pacific and Indian Ocean. At the same time, as a 
consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of small 
states in Europe has increased dramatically. We also argued that the 
proliferation of states and the EU’s recent enlargement presents 
additional challenges to the EU27 because the Union’s traditional 
regional policy instruments are ill-suited to respond to the needs of 
these new member countries. Furthermore, in drawing the lessons from 
the GFT we were able to highlight some of the weaknesses of the 
current globalised economy. We also identify some implication of the 
current crisis on Small States.  It will seem that what the crisis is bringing 
to the fore is that the actions that could have prevented the GFT, or 
could remedy its implications are the kind of initiatives that Small States 
have been arguing for some time. 
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Table 1. Small States (2 Million or less inhabitants) 
Africa East Asia, and 
Pacific 
Latin America, 
and 
the Caribbean 
Europe, Middle 
East, and  South 
Asia 
Botswana Brunei Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Bahrain 
Cape Verde Fiji Bahamas, The Bhutan 
Comoros Kiribati Barbados Cyprus 
Djibouti Marshall Islands Belize Estonia 
Equ.Guinea 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Guinea-Bissau 
Lesotho 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Sao Tome and  
Principe 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Micronesia (FS) 
Palau 
Samoa 
Solomon Islands 
Timor-Leste 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Guyana 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Iceland 
Luxembourg 
Maldives 
Malta 
Montenegro 
Qatar 
San Marino 
(Slovenia) 
Source: Based on Favaro and Peretz (2008), Box 1.1, p.3; EU members in 
bold (added) 
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Table 2. Eligibility of Small States to EU Regional Programmes 
 Cohesion 
Fund 
Convergence 
Objective 
Regional 
Competitiveness 
and 
Employment 
European 
Territorial 
Co-
operation 
 
Cyprus             Yes             No              Yes         Yes 
Estonia             Yes              Yes                No              Yes 
Malta             Yes              Yes                No         Yes 
Slovenia             Yes              Yes                No          Yes 
Source: www.ec.europa.eu/regional_policy 
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Table 3. Cohesion Policy (2007-13), (indicative) per capita financial 
allocation by EU27 member state (‘000 EUR, Current Prices)   
Belgium               212 Luxembourg               134 
Bulgaria               895 Hungary             2519 
Czech  Republic             2571 Malta             2040 
Denmark               112 Netherlands               116 
Germany               320 Austria               175 
Estonia             2579 Poland             1765 
Greece            1820 Portugal             2026 
Spain              778 Slovenia             2077 
France              225 Slovakia             2146 
Ireland              204 Finland              324 
Italy              483 Sweden              206        
Cyprus              805 United Kingdom               173 
Latvia            2035 Romania               914 
Lithuania            2045 EU27              698 
Source: Author’s calculations from www.ec.europa.eu/regional_policy. 
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